Trust But Verify

  • Our voting machines here in Utah sound like the same as Timothy's in Ohio (below): touch-screen electronic systems, but with a paper tape printout for verification. Seems to work well.

  • I wasn't too concerned about the Diebold-type electronic voting machines until I read Avi Rubin's book, Brave New Ballot. I recommend it highly.

    Meanwhile, Avi's book motivated me to volunteer to become a poll worker, which I did for the 2008 general election - I highly recommend that as well.

    Here in Maryland, we use the Diebold machines, but this may be the last election for that. The state has decided to go back to the optical-scan ballots, which I think is an excellent idea. However, we are obligated to pay for the Diebold machines through 2012.

    The election in our precinct went smoothly. We only had long lines first thing in the morning, and even then, the maximum wait was about 1/2 hour. Poll workers and voters, regardless of party, seemed neighborly and cheerful.

    As a check-in judge, I can tell you that the "ePoll Book" computers worked without a hitch. This really speeds up the time required to verify a voter is on the roll for the precint, and that he has not yet voted or received an absentee ballot. If the voter is not in the precinct, you can check the entire state and direct the voter to the correct precinct, all in seconds.

  • I think it is not a coincidence that financial systems are ahead of political systems when it comes to how to cater for mass systems of distributed transactions (AKA ATMs). Financial systems have audits, traces, logs and can verify information. A political vote is a very special transaction. It leaves no trace. It came from nowhere. Even you the voter cannot be asked what you voted two later – you might be ashamed of the choice you made and have since changed your mind. All this wealth and power is assigned in a vacuum environment. The voting decision is so important and precious and it came from nowhere, known to be volatile and leaves no trace other than the ballot result.

    There are no vote accountants, only surveyors and statisticians. It is a unique transaction for mankind there is no comparison to any other transactions we do. People complain that financial systems are complicated. That is because financial systems are an amalgamation of many other complicated systems (like weather or oil production and mass psychology). But political systems are the ultimate in complexity and influence. Everything is politics including financial systems. Everything affects the votes. It is the most volatile system we have, and the mechanism by which we transfer power is most difficult one we have. Come to think of it even technology is politics. I do not think there is a line of code to solve this problem.

  • I like the idea of a receipt that I can see but not touch, which can later be audited by election officials. However, I also want a printed receipt with a unique code to take away from the voting booth, which I can take home (or to the library) and use, along with a pass phrase I provided, to verify that my votes are STILL recorded just as I cast them, all the way up until the day after the counting stops.

    Here in King County in Washington State, we have seen that the party apparatus will attempt to manipulate and fabricate votes throughout the process, even up through the last recount. Thus, the ability to verify and to audit must extend through the end of the election process.

    I also think that the code which drives the systems must be open source.

    David Rogers

    Bellevue, WA

  • All voting systems are prone to errors and corruption. Paper votes can be altered, replaced or "lost" so I would not say that having a paper voting system is any better or worse than an electronic one. We are simply replacing one set of issues for another. The key is the steps taken to verify the results and avoid corruption. I would say that electronic voting offers more opportunity for higher level of accuracy (and no hanging chads :hehe: ) than a pure paper system ... but I also believe it offers potential for higher level of corruption.

    In Kansas we had an electronic voting machine but no paper review. This worries me because there is no paper verification process. I like the idea of being able to view the paper receipt for verification... but in the end even this can be corrupted. So beyond everyone getting together and raising your hand in favor of your choice... we will always have issues and corruption.

    David

  • Timothy Beight (11/19/2008)


    The electronic voting machines we use here in Amherst, OH (west of Cleveland) tally electronically, but also literally print your selections on a paper tape that is captive in the machine, but visible behind a clear window for each voter to read and verify before finalizing the voting "transaction." The voter cannot walk away with the paper, but it is available to the Board of Elections if needed in a recount. It seems like a good compromise.

    We use the same ones here in Orange County, California. The selections are made using a knob to move the selection from one candidate or proposition to the next, then you have to press a separate button to actively select that candidate or proposition answer. When you have completed all your selections you are asked to verify your choices before they are printed, and then verify again that the printed selections are correct befor the ballot is actually cast.

  • Jack Corbett (11/19/2008)


    I actually think it is amazing that we cannot vote on-line. I pay all my bills on-line, I submit my tax return on-line, and can even do my taxes on-line. Granted there will be issues that need to be dealt with, and it may be difficult because there are always state\local issues so the electronic ballot would have to be able to handle that as well.

    Why not have electronic voting machines that record the results, print out a scannable receipt that is the voter can review and then submit for scanning that verifies the electronically recorded votes. You could even do the voting from home and if the scannable ballot is correct you mail it in or choose to "trust" the electronic system.

    I agree - I do almost everything on line now. There must be a way to securely identify the voter the way we have security questions stored for access to our financial information know.

  • jonny.barnstorf (11/19/2008)


    In Canada our ballot is only for electing a person into office. We don't have resolutions to vote on. This year's ballot was about 6" x 8" and had 4 circles with 4 names beside them. Show your ID, Pencil an X in the circle for your choice and push the ballot in a box. Took about 10 minutes. USA has a higher volume of voters but I would imagne a higer volume of ballot counters as well.

    In short though, I'd want to see a printout behind the plastic window as well. Even in Canada. As much as I trust computers (when they work), it's the people running the computers or manipulating the data that betrays the trust. And it is much easier and faster to adjust 100,000 electronic votes than to falsify 100,000 paper verifications. I also wouldn't reccommend voters get a copy to take home as previously stated these can be subsequently falsified. What about employing an electric medium in the voting machine that is write only?

    Jb

    On my November ballot I voted for:

    President/VP

    Member of the House of Representatives

    State Senator

    State Representative

    City Council (select any two)

    School Board (select any three)

    Community College Representatives (select any two)

    County Judges (select any three)

    One local proposition

    Eleven state propositions

  • Yeah - Canada is a bit less of a democracy than the US. We vote for less things. But we have more vote times. The latest vote was for the federal government leader/party. But other votes at a provincial or municipal level or for referendums happen regularly - just not all at the same time.

    For the record, I had more than 4 parties that I could vote for in my region of Canada on the last vote - I had 7. There are more than 2 to vote for - this just splits the vote more ways so that we generally have a minority government in Canada. Not one party can force their views onto the rest of government without having some sort of alliance with another party in the legislature on one issue.

    Either way, I would rather vote online so that I don't have to get off my butt in a Canadian winter and go outside to be democratic. I want to be democratic inside under a down comforter at my leisure. 😛

    Mia

    I have come to the conclusion that the top man has one principle responsibility: to provide an atmosphere in which creative mavericks can do useful work.
    -- David M. Ogilvy

  • jpowers (11/19/2008)


    I agree - I do almost everything on line now. There must be a way to securely identify the voter the way we have security questions stored for access to our financial information know.

    That's part of the problem. With ATM and with online banking, the user is uniquely attached to the transaction, and the whole relationship can be backtracked and audited. If a bank transaction goes wrong (and they do) the customer, the bank, or both will quickly be aware that something is wrong and have immediate incentive to backtrack and correct it.

    This is the opposite of the voting problem. You need to authenticate that you are a voter, and vote once, but the transaction is by design NOT tracked to you, there is no record of whom you voted for.

    And it goes deeper because you can see in your statement if your bank deposited was credited, but you have no way to know if your vote was counted.

    ...

    -- FORTRAN manual for Xerox Computers --

  • jay holovacs (11/19/2008)


    That's part of the problem. With ATM and with online banking, the user is uniquely attached to the transaction, and the whole relationship can be backtracked and audited. If a bank transaction goes wrong (and they do) the customer, the bank, or both will quickly be aware that something is wrong and have immediate incentive to backtrack and correct it.

    This is the opposite of the voting problem. You need to authenticate that you are a voter, and vote once, but the transaction is by design NOT tracked to you, there is no record of whom you voted for.

    And it goes deeper because you can see in your statement if your bank deposited was credited, but you have no way to know if your vote was counted.

    Yes, but if the transaction (vote) has, which it should, a unique id attached to it you could verify it by the unique id. Once the vote is recorded and verified you cannot change it, so you could go back and look at.

  • If everyone just agreed to crown me King, all of these voting issues would be gone.

    As well as the people I deemed stupid or annoying or just simply refused to crown me King.

  • Jack Corbett (11/19/2008)


    Yes, but if the transaction (vote) has, which it should, a unique id attached to it you could verify it by the unique id. Once the vote is recorded and verified you cannot change it, so you could go back and look at.

    There is a historic objection to that, similar to objections to a voting receipt. It provides a mechanism for fraud, because you can (or be forced to) demonstrate your vote. Potential is opened for vote selling and coerced votes.

    And as to my last sentence (on a different aspect of uncertainty as to why voting is a tougher problem than banking), it still does not prove your vote was counted. You can validate your bank deposit because your balance was altered in a mathematically verifiable and you can withdraw that amount from the bank. Just because your receipt says you voted for 'A', you have no way to know (other than trust) that yours is included in the published totals.

    ...

    -- FORTRAN manual for Xerox Computers --

  • developmentalmadness (11/19/2008)


    skjoldtc (11/19/2008)


    The idea of having the voter receive a paper receipt of their choices is bad. Fake copies will proliferate making the problem worse.

    If you're referring to the comment by Timothy Beight then you misunderstood. The voter gets to see the receipt, but the voter doesn't receive it. We had the same thing in Utah. You are asked to verify your vote was recorded correctly by looking at a printed receipt which you can see behind a plastic cover. But you can't actually touch the receipt and you never get a copy. I really like this idea as it satisfies the ability to verify the vote through an audit. I was very confident my vote was correctly recorded.

    I was referring to the post by barb.wendling. I took it to mean that you would receive a paper receipt.

  • No one so far has mentioned that electronic voting system sold has been proven to be easily compromised on location. A handful of people posing as voters can compromise the votes of an entire precinct in a short time. They can then move on to another nearby precinct and do the same thing, since they don't have to prove their identity (just state a name that is on the precinct list, which is easily done with a bit of geographic research).

    The electronic vote collection process is distributed into an insecure environment. Even if you are shown a piece of paper you have no proof that the electonic vote matches that piece of paper. Most precincts that have reasonable (but tampered) numbers will not be audited against the paper copy. As all data experts know, when there are multiple copies of the same data, chances of discrepancies are good.

    A system in which voters fill in a piece of paper which is then dropped into a secured box and taken to a counting location are tamper-proof as long as we trust the volunteer workers. We have to trust these people in either a paper-only or an electronic system. An electronic system introduces more variables, and the electonic variables have been shown to be untrustworthy.

    I'm not a security expert, but I've read multiple articles by those who are. None of them (except the employees of the vendors) that I'm aware of think that the electronic voting systems are as secure as paper. Some of the things I've read about them are downright scary.

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